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When the devout religion of  mine eye 
0DLQWDLQHVVXFKIDOVKRRGWKHQWXUQHWHDUHVWRÀUH
-Shakespeare, Romeo & Juliet, Act I Scene ii
Part I: Introduction
In this paper, I argue that planning is impelled by an optimism that mirrors faith. Like a religion, 
planning has an historical cannon and, mirroring the trajectory of  the Reformation, survived a 
crisis of  faith—the urban renewal of  the post-war years. Latter day planning is no less driven by its 
convictions, but it is far more modest regarding doctrinal certainty. As I explore below, planning’s 
origin in the modern project implies both its certainty and its skepticism. For just as surely as the 
early moderns were driven to create a new science as a bulwark against the arbitrariness of  the divine 
right of  kings, they also recognized the need to create a new authority—a new god as it were—that 
could supplant the hegemony of  church and throne that had erstwhile served as the sources of  social 
coordination. Planning is heir to this optimism. Planning is animated (if  not haunted) by the specter 
of  its scientism, blind adherence to which is the source of  many of  its woes. At the same time, 
planners have come to recognize the limits of  their discipline and the pitfalls of  blind adherence to its 
faith.
0\DUJXPHQWDGYDQFHVDVIROORZV,ÀUVWRXWOLQHRULVWKHSURSHUZRUG´FDULFDWXUHµ"WKHDSSURDFK
WRNQRZOHGJHDQGVFLHQFHWRZKLFKSODQQLQJLVDQKHLU,WKHQVKRZWKHOLPLWVRI WKHVFLHQWLÀFPRGHO
as they pertain to the world of  public affairs. If  the model is taken to be the statement of  faith, the 
recognition of  the limits of  this faith is planning’s moment of  reformation, which I outline next. 
)LQDOO\,UHÁHFWRQWKHXWLOLW\RI WKHDQDORJ\RI UHOLJLRQDQGZKHWKHUSODQQLQJÀWVLQWRWKLVLGLRP
Losing Its Religion: 
Planning as Faith
Charles Kaylor
This paper makes the claim that planning is fueled by the same optimistic faith in human 
reason as the modern sciences generally. At times, this faith takes on the contours of  a religion. 
The excesses of  urban renewal projects challenged the core of  this faith, however, serving as 
planning’s reformation. Planning remains heavily indebted to its central tenets. Science remains 
the lodestar, but this is placed in dynamic tension with an effort at making decisions that 
FRPSRUWZLWKWKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVWZKLFKLVGLIÀFXOWLI QRWLPSRVVLEOHWRPHDVXUHYLDWKHWRROVRI 
science. As a result, planning remains animated by a progressivism that resembles faith, but one 
WKDWLVWKRURXJKO\GHP\VWLÀHG
Agora  2007 49
Part II: Baptism in Modernism, Or the Articles of Faith
Modernity, of  course, did not simply awaken one day. The steady erosion of  despotic kingly rule and 
the grip of  the church in Europe was punctuated with cataclysms and acts of  violence too numerous 
to mention. That said, the turn that unquestionably occurred was a gradual awakening to the power 
of  human knowledge and the capacity of  ordinary people to create a legacy of  understanding—an 
episteme—far more powerful than the capriciousness of  kings and clerics. For, as the early proselytes 
RI WKLVQHZIDLWKXQGHUVWRRGWKLVQHZZD\RI EHLQJZDVFHQWHUHGQRWRQLQÁH[LEOHGRJPDVEXWRQ
WKHH[WUDRUGLQDU\SRZHURI WKHVFLHQWLÀFPHWKRG$V'HVFDUWHVDUJXHGWKHROGRUGHUSODFHG*RGDW
the center. Human knowledge was dictated (if  not held in check) by the Holy Scripture as revealed 
to and interpreted by the ecclesiastical authorities. Audaciously, Descartes declared that the old 
order should be sloughed off  like tattered rags and that a new science should emerge that allowed 
humans to take their rightful place as the “masters and possessors of  nature.” Descartes and others 
who sought to establish this new way of  being succeeded in subverting the powers that had jealously 
guarded knowledge as a means of  keeping the masses in their thrall. Indeed, the subversion would be 
accomplished by radically democratizing access to knowledge.
7KHFRUQHUVWRQHRI WKLVQHZVHFXODURUGHULVWKHVFLHQWLÀFPHWKRG$V'HVFDUWHVSURFODLPHG´,Q
order to make our knowledge complete, every single thing relating to understanding must be surveyed 
LQDFRQWLQXRXVDQGZKROO\XQLQWHUUXSWHGVZHHSRI WKRXJKWDQGEHLQFOXGHGLQDVXIÀFLHQWDQGZHOO
ordered enumeration” (Descartes 1985, 25). The goal of  human liberation was to be accomplished, 
in Descartes’ view, by unleashing the human intellect and imagination. This required the foundation 
of  a new science, meaning a commitment to the rigors of  a new, non-religious discipline. As Bacon, 
a contemporary, put it, “There was but one course left, therefore,—to try the whole thing anew upon 
a better plan, and to commence a total reconstruction of  the sciences, arts, and all human knowledge, 
raised upon the proper foundations” (Bacon 1980, 2). Bacon’s optimism that human reason could 
create certain knowledge upon which to base decisions is the hallmark of  modern faith. That 
faith was far from unchallenged prior to the dawn of  the social sciences in the nineteenth century. 
1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJPXFKUHÀQHPHQWDQGDJRQL]LQJLQWURVSHFWLRQWKHFRPPLWPHQWWRKXPDQUHDVRQ
remained intact.
The centrality of  self-critique is vital. Unlike blind faith, the goal of  perfected human sciences 
articulated by Descartes and Bacon rests on the ruthless scrutiny and introspection that make 
GLVFRYHU\SRVVLEOH7KHLGHRORJ\RI VFLHQFHLVQRWZKROO\LQÁH[LEOHDQGUHVLVWDQWWRFKDQJH+RZHYHU
the people and institutions that operate in its name often are.  As Kuhn points out in his account 
of  paradigm change, “concepts—whether in the natural or social world—are the possession of  
communities (cultures or subcultures)” (Klemke et al. 1998, 130). The embeddedness of  science 
in human discourse and the shifting sands of  politico-academic intrigue mean that new knowledge 
necessarily dislodges and disrupts. The authority of  old ideas begins to break down and new ones 
arise to take their place, often only with much anguish. (Bernstein 1976, 84-93).
3RSSHULGHDOL]HVDQRUJDQLFPRGHORI KXPDQLQTXLU\WKDWFKDOOHQJHVDQ\VSHFLÀFLQVWDQWLDWLRQRI 
science while retaining the optimistic article of  faith. For Popper, the “truth” that science constantly 
reveals is that “Truth” is never to be attained. “I too hold that hypotheses cannot be asserted to be 
‘true’ statements, but that they are ‘provisional conjectures’ (or something of  the sort)…” (Popper 
1935, 264). As such, the god of  the new science is a constantly evolving and moving target. A science 
Agora  200750
WKDWLVZRUWKLWVVDOWLVFRQVWDQWO\XQGHUPLQLQJFRQÀGHQFHLQLWVHOI$QGWKHVRUWRI WUXWKWKDWHPHUJHV
LVQHYHUKDUGDQGIDVW´2XUVFLHQFHLVQRWNQRZOHGJHHSLVWēPēLWFDQQHYHUFODLPWRKDYHDWWDLQHG
the truth, or even a substitute for it such as probability…We do not know: we can only guess” 
(Popper 1935, 278). Despite this cautious and self-critical core, truth remains the lodestar for the 
sciences. Even though truth is elusive and certainty is always in doubt, the goal of  truth (provisional 
though it may be) still impels the sciences. We may dislodge such certainty with a new one, à la Khun, 
but, until disproved, the provisional truths function as tenets and justify action by their adherents.
Even though foregrounded by Popper’s methodical skepticism, the social sciences are not immune to 
the allure of  provisional truths. As Bernstein explains, “[a]t the core of  this naturalistic interpretation 
is the conviction that the aim of  the social sciences is the same as the natural sciences…. At the heart 
RI VFLHQWLÀFH[SODQDWLRQWKHUHPXVWEHGLVFRYHU\RI DQGDSSHDOWRODZVRUQRPRORJLFDOVWDWHPHQWVµ
%HUQVWHLQ1DWXUDOO\WKHUHDUHTXHVWLRQHUVDQGFULWLFVRI LPSRUWLQJWKHQDWXUDOVFLHQWLÀF
method wholesale into the study of  human affairs, events and institutions. For example, Kuhn 
argues that there is no guiding paradigm in the human sciences, meaning that the attachment to the 
naturalistic approach is incomplete (if  not improper) (Klemke et al. 1978, 133). Notwithstanding such 
WUHQFKDQWDFFRXQWVRI WKHWHQVLRQVDQGGXDOLWLHVDWLWVFRUHWKHVFLHQWLÀFSDUDGLJPUHLJQVVXSUHPH
across the contemporary academy and within the planning practice. As such, the faith at the core of  
this method continues to animate the approach of  social scientists, planners among them. And, as we 
shall see below, the wholesale application of  this faith in addressing the pathologies of  urban living 
was prone to the same metaphysical myopia (and violence) that plagued the rest of  the sciences.
Part III: The Engineering Model, Or Planning’s Blind Faith
So far, I have discussed in general terms how planning is heir to a tradition that functions in many 
ways like a community of  faith. The next matter is to explore how planning does or does not follow 
the same trajectory of  other sciences. Planning is at its heart an ambiguity, straddling as it does the 
border between physical sciences (given its focus on land use and rationalization of  space) and the 
social sciences (given its simultaneous focus on social institutions and improvement). Insofar as 
planning has tended to uncritically embrace the modes of  inquiry and action it has inherited, its 
adherents fall prey to the same excesses as its cousins. As was the case with the other social sciences, 
planning’s attempts to establish itself  as a rigorous discipline in the twentieth century led it to the 
limits of  its foundational optimism.
From the outset planning was prone to embrace the positivist method. The consequence of  such 
an embrace is summarized by Bernstein: “Anything that cannot…satisfy the severe standards set by 
these disciplines…is to be viewed with suspicion” (Bernstein 1976, 5). The clearest embodiment 
of  the positivist approach to planning is the movement toward synoptic planning, a notion that the 
planner can understand (or should even attempt to understand) all the contingencies and vagaries that 
VXUURXQGDSODQDQGWKDWWKHVFLHQWLÀFPHWKRGZLOOSURGXFH´UDWLRQDOµSODQVWKDWIXQFWLRQWRIXOÀOO
´WKHSXEOLFLQWHUHVWµ7KHVFLHQWLÀFDQFLOODU\WRWKLVFRPSUHKHQVLYHDSSURDFKRI FRXUVHZDVWKHIROO\
RI SROLF\DQDO\VLVRUWKHEDVLFFRQFHLWWKDWVRFLDOVFLHQWLÀFPHWKRGRORJ\FDQSURGXFHFHUWDLQDEVROXWH
theoretical understanding, distilled through the apolitical sanctity of  the academy. Indeed, by the mid-
WZHQWLHWKFHQWXU\SODQQHUVZHUHFDSWLYDWHGE\WKHPRGHORI EXUHDXFUDWLFDQGVFLHQWLÀFSHUIHFWLRQWKDW
ZRXOGHQDEOHVFLHQFHWRGLVWLOOXQLÀHG´JRDOVIRUVRFLHW\µIURPWKHFDFRSKRQ\RI QHHGVLQWHUHVWVDQG
voices that make up the public sphere. As Altshuler describes it: “Comprehensive planning requires 
of  planners that they understand the overall goals of  their communities…. [T]he explicit claims 
of  practicing planners often suggests that a fair approximation of  genuine comprehensiveness is 
currently attainable” (Altshuler 1965, 186-187). Thus, the importation of  positivism into the applied 
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social sciences was essentially the re-inscribing of  the engineering model into the social domain.  
Harris explains the stakes: “The desires and goals of  society as a whole are the controlling factor in 
the whole planning process” (Harris 1967, 324), which, of  course, presupposes that the planning 
process can comprehend and operate on the basis of  these goals.
:KHQSODQQLQJ·VKXEULVÀQDOO\UHDFKHGLWVDSRWKHRVLVLQWKHXUEDQUHQHZDOH[SHULPHQWVLQWKH¶VDQG
‘60s, many recognized that the headlong embrace of  modern science’s articles of  faith may have been 
in error. The ballyhooed role for a perfected science of  planning and social engineering was a product 
of  its time, of  course. With the combined awesome displays of  social and physical engineering that 
put an end to the Depression and harnessed the power of  the atom, it is understandable that such 
optimism carried the day. And, as was the case with Icarus, such hubris must ultimately be visited by a 
painful crashing to the recalcitrant ground of  stubborn human nature.
7KHFRQÁLFWEHWZHHQGRFWULQDLUHDGKHUHQWVRI WKHVFLHQWLÀFDSSURDFKDQGDGYRFDWHVRI D´QRUPDWLYHµ
approach (Bernstein 1976, 42-45) was not simply academic. At the same time, the capacity of  either 
entrenched system of  belief  and practice was only to provide questionable assistance to practitioners 
at best. At its worst, blind adherence to technocracy and the dictates of  science turned cities to rubble 
in the hopes of  recreating and perfecting them. But when the realities of  the political and budgetary 
processes set in, science was only able to deconstruct and rubble was all that was left.
Part IV: God is Dead: The Crisis of Faith
It would be an error to say that social scientists failed to see the crisis coming. From the very outset 
of  the social sciences, foundational thinkers recognized the limitations inherent in their approach. For 
H[DPSOH:HEHUZDVTXLWHDZDUHRI WKHOLPLWDWLRQVRI DGRJPDWLFDQGLQÁH[LEOHSRVLWLYLVP:HEHU
claimed that social solidarity is built upon a basic unencoded code of  what is reasonable (Weber 
1978). On his reading, modernity is characterized by a near-universal internalization of  instrumental 
UDWLRQDOLW\³ZHDUHXQLÀHGYLDYDULRXVIRUPDOL]LQJWKLQJVVXFKDVWKHPDUNHWLQZKLFKZHRSHUDWH
to maximize our individually determined best interests, and the state, which treats us as abstract 
bearers of  rights and organizations. Without thinking about it, we understand ourselves as our social 
security numbers and our credit scores. This cognitive glue that cements modern societies is in many 
respects the same form of  rationality that enables its intellectual pursuits (i.e., the instrumental reason 
of  positivism). Thus, Weber suggests that the embrace of  positivism is hardly a necessity, but it is 
WKHVWXEERUQIUDPHRI UHIHUHQFHIRUWKHGHQL]HQVRI WKHPRGHUQZRUOGDQGLVWKHUHIRUHGLIÀFXOWWR
displace. In fact, alternative forms of  rationality and solidarity do, or at least should, exist (as we shall 
see below through Habermas). The challenge is for social science to explain the residual: that which 
remains unexplained by its tools.
:HFDQVHHWKDWIDUIURPEHLQJXQLÀHGDQGXQHTXLYRFDOWKHSURVHO\WHVRI WKHQHZVFLHQFHVHVSHFLDOO\
those applied to studies of  humans and their institutions, recognized the checks on their approach. 
This cautionary posture is certainly at the heart of  much of  the debate regarding planning’s role in 
the post-Urban Renewal years. Indeed, public policy and planning professionals took great heed of  
Simon’s denunciation of  a “comprehensive science.” Against this, Simon argued for a concept of  
´ERXQGHGUDWLRQDOLW\µWKHQRWLRQWKDW´RQHGRHVQ·WKDYHWRPDNHFKRLFHVWKDWDUHLQÀQLWHO\GHHSLQ
time, that encompass the whole range of  human values, and in which each problem is interconnected 
with all the other problems of  the world” (Simon 1983, 19). As Forester describes, this recognition 
UHOLHYHGFRQVWUDLQWVIRUSROLF\GHYHORSHUVDVLWOHJLWLPDWHGWKHDOUHDG\H[LVWLQJSUDFWLFHRI ´VDWLVÀFLQJµ
RUPRGLI\LQJGHFLVLRQV´WRPHHWORZHUHGH[SHFWDWLRQVH[SHFWDWLRQVWKDWFRXOGWKHQEHVDWLVÀHGUDWKHU
than optimized” (Forester 1993, 7).
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Similarly, Lindblom famously argues for attenuating the goals of  planning. The incremental approach 
he advocates lowers the sights from the ideals of  the scientism that had carried the day earlier in 
the century. Lindblom denounced the hubris of  synoptic planning: “Achieving impossible feats of  
synopsis is a bootless, unproductive ideal” (Lindblom 1979, 318). Lindblom’s articulation of  this 
quietistic approach suggests that the large-scale, comprehensive vision of  planning was too prone 
to make large mistakes. His essential understanding is that administrators are not in a position to act 
XSRQWKHSODQWKDWPD[LPL]HVEHQHÀWVKROGLQJDOOWKLQJVFRQVWDQWEHFDXVHWKLQJVDUHQHYHUFRQVWDQW
Decisions do not occur in the perfected vacuum of  the laboratory. Rather, “prescribed functions and 
constraints—the politically or legally possible—restrict their attention to relatively few values and 
relatively few alternative policies among the countless alternatives that might be imagined” (Lindblom 
1959, 80). Since this fact of  life for decision-makers always and everywhere is the one that is practiced, 
students of  policy should focus on such institutional frameworks and constraints rather than the 
idealized possible set of  alternatives. Thus, Lindblom was at the vanguard of  a movement to push 
VRFLDOVFLHQWLÀFWKLQNLQJDZD\IURPWKHKHDYHQVRI WKHWKHRUHWLFDOO\SRVVLEOHLQWRWKHPXQGDQHZRUOG
of  actual decision-making frameworks.
Both Lindblom and Simon owe a debt to the pragmatism of  the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. As is the case with these post-religious inclinations in planning in the ‘50s and ‘60s, 
pragmatism attempted to steer clear of  certainty in the social sciences, offering instead a vision for 
understanding the connection of  the past to what we can do in the present. In a deeper sense than 
that of  the contextualism inherent in Lindblom, Dewey and others recognized that experience is 
always embedded in tradition and language in ways that make it inextricable. As such, apperception 
LVDOZD\VDOUHDG\GHWHUPLQHGRUDWOHDVWLQÁXHQFHGE\´WKHZD\VLQZKLFKDFRPPRQDQGREMHFWLYH
world is enmeshed in our experience” (Bernstein 1966, 67). In making such assertions, Dewey 
separates himself  from the scientism of  Descartes and Bacon and the trajectory of  modern science, 
which so often occlude the potentially dislodging problem of  the perspective of  the scientist.  
Pragmatists sought to focus on the “hereness and nowness”—i.e., the non-metaphysicalness—of  
decisions.  In so doing, they distinguished themselves from the strand of  modern science (i.e., 
methodology) that persistently focuses on the means by which knowledge is attained.  For Dewey, 
experience is always borne by language, institutions, and, most importantly, schools.  This means that 
no “pure” science is possible.  Rather than putting stock in this false idol, Dewey hoped to return to 
an Aristotelian notion of  experiential wisdom.  This meant being steeped, not in the timeless truth of  
VFLHQWLÀF´ODZµEXWLQWKHHYHU\GD\PHDQGHULQJVRI SROLWLFVWKHPHFKDQLFVE\ZKLFKDFWXDOGHFLVLRQV
are made, and the particularities of  historical context.
Hoch explains the effort at driving the gods from the temple: “The pragmatists, like many current 
postmodern thinkers, worry that the quest for certainty becomes a power trip as those with little 
democratic sensibility use Rationality to subject others to purposes that masquerade as necessary and 
inevitable conditions” (Hoch 1984, 55). Against this, pragmatists stressed the need for a dialogical 
path, engaged with the world in which person and person forge decisions through the practice of  
decision-making. As they saw it, focusing on such matters was essential to safeguarding democratic 
institutions from the creeping despotism of  technocracy, which stresses the conformity of  a decision 
WRWKHFDOFXOXVRI FRVWVDQGEHQHÀWVDWWKHH[SHQVHRI LWVFRQIRUPLW\WRWKHGHPRFUDWLFSURFHVV
Of  course, the pragmatists have been roundly and rightly accused of  blindness to the essential 
ontological position that inspired their attempts at deontologizing the sciences. In other words, while 
KRSLQJWRSXUJHWKHIDOVHJRGRI VFLHQWLÀFFHUWDLQW\HDUO\SUDJPDWLVWVZHUHVLPXOWDQHRXVO\HQJDJHG
in an attempt to foundationalize a form of  practice that could only be sustained by a notion of  
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timelessness that borders on the divine. White convincingly argues that “individual pragmatists have 
not all been consistent about the scope of  science and because the movement as a whole has been 
divided on this question, pragmatism has never been able to present a single face to the world on 
one of  the central problems of  modern philosophy” (White 1973, 109). As such, early pragmatism, 
on which the knee-jerk position of  much post-war planning theory has rested, has itself  rested on 
a shaky foundation. The effort to dislodge the hegemony of  the “god of  science,” then, has always 
been weakened by its own inclinations. As we will see, there are some grounds for thinking that more 
contemporary versions of  pragmatism, particularly that of  Habermas, might provide a relief  from this 
metaphysical mushiness.
Part V:  Redemption via Ecumenism: Planning’s 
Deontological Turn 
In the post-halcyon days of  urban renewal, planning retreated to a less certain (but probably no more 
modest) position. Planning (and academics who study planning) attempt to put into motion processes 
that occur in the real world of  human affairs. There are manifold and complex organizations, 
institutions, histories, and legitimate claims for what ought to be done. With such complexity, no 
certain science of  the “right” or “rational” plan is possible.  The real question is how we create 
consensus regarding what is best, given that trade-offs will always have to be made. After the excesses 
of  planning’s “engineering” misadventures, alternative paths were explored that attempted to broaden 
participation and, ideally, conformance of  plans to the public interest. This trend was occasioned 
(and foreordained) by trends in the human sciences that attempted to historicize and contextualize 
knowledge, “bracketing” what is known and knowable and thoroughly problematizing the possibility 
of  a “science” of  the social world.
A crucial insight into the curious position of  planning (and other applied social sciences) was a 
return to the basics of  democratic politics (and theory). As an antidote to the univocal authority and 
manifest excesses of  statist planning (as conducted both in the West and in Eastern Europe) in the 
early- to mid-twentieth century, a variety of  voices arose to assert the importance of  civil society. 
As part of  this general tendency, many planning theorists see in Habermas’ theory of  civil society 
a middle path between abandoning the hope for a legitimate role for a robust public sector and the 
XQFULWLFDOHPEUDFHRI ZHVWHUQVFLHQFHDQGPHWDSK\VLFV)RU+DEHUPDVÀUVWDQGIRUHPRVWWKHSXEOLF
VHFWRUHQJDJHVDZRUOGWKDWLVDOZD\VRSHUDWLQJLQZD\VWKDWQRSXEOLFRIÀFLDOFDQIXOO\DGGUHVVRU
plan for), nor any science ever adequately characterize. “The public sphere cannot be conceived as an 
intuition and certainly not as an organization. It is not even a framework of  norms with differentiated 
competencies and roles. The public sphere can best be described as a network for communicating 
information and points of  view” (Habermas 1996, 360). Habermas sees this extraordinarily complex 
DQGIXQFWLRQDOO\LQFKRDWHPDVVRI FRPPXQLFDWLYHDFWVDVIRUPLQJD´IDUÁXQJQHWZRUNRI VHQVRUVµ
that effectively alert the state to the wishes of  the various individuals and organizations that constitute 
it and, simultaneously, render transparent to the latter whether or not the state is functioning 
legitimately (i.e., with respect to ensuring democratic access and procedure in rendering its decisions) 
(Habermas 1996, 1984).
For Habermas, the measuring stick by which we can evaluate the legitimacy of  decisions (and 
therefore the validity of  the planning process) is not the degree to which it squares with technical, 
VFLHQWLÀFUDWLRQDOLW\5DWKHUZKDWLVFUXFLDODUHWKHSURFHGXUHVE\ZKLFKGHFLVLRQVDUHUHQGHUHG$V
Bernstein describes it, Habermas is attempting to create a modern standard for inculcating the civic 
discourse with a shared notion of  experiential wisdom: “The capacity of  practical philosophy is 
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SKURQēVLVDSUXGHQWXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI WKHVLWXDWLRQDQGRQWKLVWKHWUDGLWLRQRI FODVVLFDOSROLWLFVKDV
continued to base itself, by way of  the prudential of  Cicero, down to Burke’s “prudence’” (Bernstein 
1976, 186). That practical wisdom is grounded in an understanding common to all the denizens of  
the modern world, according to Habermas. Following Weber’s notions of  rationality and the ubiquity 
of  the understanding of  instrumental reason, Habermas posits a parallel and equally ubiquitous form 
of  reason—communicative rationality. According to Habermas, we moderns evaluate the truth of  
IDFWFODLPVYLDWKHH[WUDRUGLQDULO\SRZHUIXOPHWKRGVDQGV\QWD[RI VFLHQWLÀFUHDVRQ:KHQZHDUH
GLVSXWLQJDQHPSLULFDOTXHVWLRQWKHQLWLVDOZD\VVXIÀFLHQWWRDSSHDOWRIDFWV%XWZKHQWKHWLPH
comes to address the “wicked” problems of  overlapping and contested questions of  politics, we 
DSSHDOWRDGLIIHUHQWVWDQGDUG1DPHO\ZKHQIDFWVDUHLQVXIÀFLHQWWRIRUJHDFRPPRQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
and consensus, all we have left is the legitimacy of  procedure.
As such, Habermas argues that a “universal pragmatics” pervades, providing us with the potential 
means to measure the legitimacy of  procedures and outcomes rendered by public authorities. For 
example, planning encountered its limit during urban renewal precisely due to technocratic myopia 
that systematically excluded input from those who were most affected. Since the process of  planning 
and decision-making made no effort to accommodate these voices, the outcry of  the public was 
VXIÀFLHQWDOEHLWWRRODWHWRVWRSWKHSURFHVVGHDGLQLWVWUDFNV7KHFULWLFDOWKHRU\RI +DEHUPDVWKHQ
is an effort to check the authoritarian inclinations of  religion as science: “Theoretical work is, like 
UHOLJLRQRUDUWDQDFWLYLW\GLVWLQJXLVKHGE\LWVUHÁH[LYLW\WKHIDFWWKDWLWPDNHVDQH[SOLFLWWKHPHRI WKH
interpretive processes on which the researcher draws does not dissolve its situational ties” (Habermas 
%\WKLVUHDGLQJWKHYHU\VFLHQWLÀFDSSURDFKWKDWHDUOLHUSODQQLQJWRRNWRKHDUWDVLWV
identity is a form of  bad faith.
Habermas’ basic premise is that science cannot redeem validity claims regarding norms. No 
amount of  laboratory research will yield truth in such matters. Rather, “the Habermasian rational 
actor is a practical communicative agent who makes claims in a community of  affected persons, 
FODLPVIRUZKLFKKHRUVKHZRXOGEHZLOOLQJWRRIIHUMXVWLÀFDWLRQVDQGDUJXPHQWVLQGLVFRXUVHV
where (in principle) only the force of  the better argument may prevail” (Forester 1976, 78). For 
Habermas, decisions are never (or very rarely) actually made in such a manner, of  course, but such 
a counterfactual provides a background idealized procedure that we more or less embody as citizens 
in a democratic society. The standards, rights, and freedoms in which citizens are steeped require at 
least the veil of  legitimacy (sometimes called window dressing) that we see in the effort to encourage 
public participation in the planning process. To fail to do so runs the risk of  a legitimacy crisis—the 
undermining of  public support.
As critical as he is of  the modern project, Habermas remains true to its optimism. As such, Habermas 
is a thinker of  profound faith. The central tenet of  faith is the capacity of  human reason, even if  
based on an understanding of  reason quite different from that of  Descartes. For Habermas, we all 
act on the basis of  communicative and instrumental rationality, balancing the two in our everyday 
lives. But the core, the principle of  faith, is that reason permeates all. Habermas is unapologetically an 
acolyte of  modernity’s faith in this regard.  
Part VI: Faith and Religion
So, is planning a religion? The answer seems to be “yes, no, and maybe.” There are certainly times 
DQGDOZD\VZLOOEHZKHQWKHSODQQHUDSSURDFKHVWKHFKDOOHQJHRI SURYLGLQJIRUWKHSXEOLFEHQHÀW
with a certainty that approaches the fervor of  the converted. And, indeed, that fervor’s origin in the 
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GDZQRI WKHH[SORVLRQRI VFLHQWLÀFSURJUHVVFRQWLQXHVWRHQWKUDOOXV7KHDGYDQFHVPDGHSRVVLEOHE\
the steady evolution of  the sciences have made even the most modest among us live better than the 
pharaohs (at least by some measures). But the enticing patina of  that approach also fails to capture 
the complete story. A crucial distinction should be made between faith in the tools and techniques 
that have evolved since modernity’s dawn and adherence to the strict doctrines of  religion. Planning’s 
overweening devotion to its science led to the disasters of  urban renewal. To carry the analogy, then, 
planning’s elevation to a doctrine fell short. Continued faith in the progress science can make possible, 
however, is the crux of  planning’s relevance.
Rittel and Webber speak of  “wicked” problems. They claim that in their haste to cure the abundant 
SUREOHPVRI XUEDQOLIHSODQQHUVDWWKHGDZQRI WKHSURIHVVLRQODWFKHGRQWRWKHVFLHQWLÀF
engineering approach. By doing so, they were able to resolve many of  the problems that conformed 
to these rigors. But “now that these relatively easy problems have been dealt with, we have been 
turning our attention to others that are much more stubborn…The professionalized cognitive and 
RFFXSDWLRQDOVW\OHVWKDWZHUHUHÀQHGLQWKHÀUVWKDOI RI WKLVFHQWXU\EDVHGRQ1HZWRQLDQPHFKDQLVWLF
physics, are not readily adapted to contemporary conceptions of  interacting open systems and to 
contemporary concerns with equity” (Rittel and Webber 1973, 166). The zeal and fervor with which 
HDUO\SODQQHUVPHVKHGWKHJRGVRI WKHVFLHQWLÀFDSSURDFKWRWKHPDQLIHVWSDWKRORJLHVRI XUEDQOLIH
met their limit. No amount of  demolishing in order to rebuild a better inner city could overcome 
the violence inherent in urban renewal. No calculus of  “rationality” in the best-trained planning 
mind could overcome urban civic complexity. As such, planning had to abandon its god—the 
IDFLOHHPEUDFHRI 1HZWRQLDQSK\VLFVDVDSDQDFHDIRUVRFLDOLOOV$ODWWHUGD\GHP\VWLÀHGJRGKDV
transcended this inevitable twilight of  the idols. Planners are still motivated by the conviction that 
attempting to address these “wicked” problems is their vocation. It is obeisance to the mundane that 
now serves as planning’s sublimation.
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